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CONFLICT BETWEEN PRETEXTING IN M&A 
INVESTIGATIVE DUE DILIGENCE AND THE ABA 
MODEL RULES OF ETHICS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of due diligence in a merger and acquisition (M&A) 
transaction is to determine the appropriate purchase price to be paid by 
the buyer. In order to determine the purchase price there should be a 
thorough investigation and analysis of legal and financial risks, including 
the discovery of liabilities that may be deal-breakers. The due diligence 
process typically encompasses legal, financial, and commercial due dili-
gence. Another aspect of due diligence is investigative due diligence, 
which utilizes a wide range of intelligence gathering techniques includ-
ing covert activities that are used to perform thorough background 
checks on a target and its key employees.1 The investigative due dili-
gence team should be an outside investigative firm that can offer an un-
biased review of the potential target and expose any derogatory infor-
mation such as a history of violating the law, fraud, bribery or any uneth-
ical behavior that can ultimately affect the purchase price or possibly 
terminate the transaction.2 
Corporate investigative due diligence firms have the ability to un-
cover facts about a potential target that conventional due diligence teams 
cannot. One example of this ability occurred when undercover investiga-
tors discovered that half of the top executives of a target company were 
unindicted co-conspirators in a fraudulent deal and the company had 
changed its name in order to conceal that fact.3 It is unlikely that conven-
tional due diligence methods would uncover corporate intelligence of 
this type. Most intelligence gathering is legal, but it is usually done cov-
ertly, often without the knowledge of the targeted company.4 The inves-
tigative work may be legal but is it ethical and will the investigator’s 
practices run counter to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct result-
ing in disciplinary proceedings and sanctions, including civil and crimi-
nal liability for the lawyer that hired the investigative firm? Also, is it 
  
 1. Chris Brady and Scott Moeller, INTELLIGENT M&A: NAVIGATING THE MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS MINEFIELD (West Sussex: John Wiley and Sons, Ltd, 2014), (accessed December 8, 
2015) http://booksupport.wiley.com. 
 2. Investigators: Compliance, M&A, JV, Due Diligence and More, 
METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, (May 1, 2008), 
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/9863/investigators-compliance-ma-jv-due-diligence-and-
more. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
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ethical for an undercover investigator to misrepresent his or her identity 
and purpose, and the identity of the client that hired him or her? 
Although lawyers face an ethical obligation to pursue various tactics 
in M&A due diligence in order to represent adequately their client’s in-
terests in structuring and pricing the transaction, competing ethical limi-
tations prevent lawyers and those who work for them from engaging in 
certain controversial investigative techniques employed by private inves-
tigators. One such investigative technique is pretexting. Pretexting, also 
referred to as dissemblance, can be defined as conduct involving misrep-
resentation of one’s identity and purpose in order to obtain information 
not otherwise available.5 Pretexting is an investigative technique that is 
widely used by criminal, intellectual property, and civil rights lawyers. 
However, it is in direct opposition to the ABA Model Rules of Profes-
sional Responsibility and the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct 
(CRPC), Rule 8.4(c), which strictly prohibits any lawyer in Colorado 
from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrep-
resentation with no exception.6 
This article will examine the relevant Rules of Professional Conduct 
that create conflict for lawyers and undercover investigators that utilize 
pretexting techniques during M&A investigative due diligence. This arti-
cle will also analyze and compare Rule 8.4(c) of Colorado and Oregon, 
two states at opposite ends of the ethics spectrum, and offer a proposed 
amendment to Colorado Rule 8.4(c) as a solution to the ethical limita-
tions placed on lawyers and undercover investigators. 
What ethical responsibilities does a lawyer and a private investiga-
tor have while performing investigative due diligence during an M&A 
transaction? The following section will discuss the relevant ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct that affect both lawyers and investigators 
ethics responsibilities while performing pretext investigations. 
II. RELEVANT ABA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT THAT AFFECT 
LAWYERS AND PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS DURING M&A INVESTIGATIVE 
DUE DILIGENCE. 
The relevant ABA Model Rules implicating professional responsi-
bility for lawyers and private investigators performing covert operations 
during the due diligence phase of an M&A transaction include Model 
Rules 4.1(a) truthful communications, 4.2 communications with adverse 
parties represented by counsel, 4.3 communications with parties unrepre-
sented by counsel, 8.4(c) prohibition of misrepresentation, and 5.3(b) 
using nonlawyer assistants. Other Model Rules may be applicable be-
  
 5. Jeremy R. Feinberg, Report on Pretexting: Recent Cases and Ethics Opinions, NEW YORK 
LEGAL ETHICS REPORTER, (June 1, 2009), http://www.newyorklegalethics.com/report-on-pretexting-
recent-cases-ethics-opinions/. 
 6. COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2012) [hereinafter COLORADO RULES]. 
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cause of the interweaving of specific rules depending on the conduct and 
particular situation. 
A. Model Rule 8.4(c) Misrepresentation; and Model Rule 4.1(a) Truth-
fulness in Statements to Others 
1. Model Rule 8.4(c). Misconduct: It is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation. 
2. Model Rule 4.1(a). Truthfulness in Statements to Others: In the 
course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly make a 
false statement of material fact or law to a third person. 
Model Rules 8.4(c) and 4.1(a) proscribe misrepresentation and 
knowingly making false statements to others. However, lawyers’ use of 
undercover investigators that misrepresent their client is common prac-
tice and indispensable in many M&A transactions, especially in the 
emerging global economy, where developing countries ideas concerning 
ethical behavior vary greatly as to what is, and isn’t ethical.7 Investiga-
tors retained by legal counsel may fall into a legal gray area. One exam-
ple is the employment of deceptive conduct in order to protect a client’s 
rights. An acquiring company may covertly obtain negative information 
from a target company that it is purposefully withholding because of its 
adverse effect on the value of the target company and the ultimate pur-
chase price. A scenario such as this happened in Colorado where a trans-
portation firm abandoned its plans for the acquisition of a privately held 
trucking company after a covert investigation revealed that the CEO of 
the target company was also the CEO of a Utah trucking firm that was in 
bankruptcy.8 The acquisition ultimately failed due to the target firm’s 
lack of candor toward the acquiring firm. It has been suggested that law-
yers may need to consider resorting to such activities as part of their ob-
ligation under ABA Model Rule 1.1 (Colo. Rule 1.3) to provide zealous 
and competent representation of their clients.9  
Indeed, conduct involving misrepresentation of one’s identity and 
purpose in order to obtain information not otherwise available, the very 
definition of the act of pretexting, may be necessary in order to adequate-
ly represent clients from target firms that are not forthcoming with nega-
tive information, thus creating potentially disastrous financial results. 
Case in point, MCI’s purchase of a controlling interest in Embratel, a 
state-owned Brazilian communications company for $2.3 billion, several 
  
 7. “Hiring a private investigator is resurfacing as an integral part of due diligence during 
mergers and acquisitions . . .  While Tom Hix, CFO of Cooper Cameron Corp., won’t say if he uses 
private investigators, he does say the practice is common.” Joseph McCafferty, DEAL DETECTIVES, 
CFO 13 (2): 16 (1997), http://search.proquest.com/docview/196855425?accountid=14608.  
 8. Id. 
 9. See Monroe H. Freedman, In Praise of Overzealous Representation: Lying to Judges, 
Deceiving Third Parties, and Other Ethical Conduct, 34 Hofstra L. Rev. 771, 772 (2006). 
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months later MCI was assessed $650 million in back taxes from the Bra-
zilian government. MCI ultimately sold its interest in Embratel several 
years later for $400 million.10 Thus, the stakes are high and the MCI de-
bacle lends support for Model Rule 1.1’s zealous and competent repre-
sentation of clients as well as the use of pretexting to uncover infor-
mation not otherwise available to the acquiring company. 
Model Rule 8.4(c) bars lawyers from engaging in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Further, 8.4(a) bars cir-
cumventing rules by proxy, such as the case when hiring investigators.11 
According to Model Rule 8.4(c), lawyers who supervise undercover in-
vestigations are actually condoning deception indirectly through investi-
gators.12 Model Rule 8.4(a) specifically states that it is professional mis-
conduct and lawyers are subject to discipline when they violate or at-
tempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or 
induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another.13 However, 
paragraph (a) does not prohibit a lawyer from advising a client concern-
ing action the client is legally entitled to take, which falls under most 
activities by undercover investigators.14 A client has a right to know neg-
ative information that is deceptively being withheld from an acquiring 
company that may ultimately affect the purchase price of the target com-
pany. 
Model Rule 4.1(a) prohibits a lawyer in the course of representing a 
client from knowingly making a false statement of material fact to a third 
person.15 Generally, both Model Rules 8.4 and 4.1 prevent lawyers from 
misrepresenting themselves and investigators during the course of an 
investigation. In our case, in-house counsel conducting an investigation 
during the due diligence phase of an M&A transaction is considered to 
be in the course of representing a client and misrepresenting his identity 
is a false statement of fact. The statement is material because without the 
misrepresentation, the information sought would not be given, thus vio-
lating Rule 4.1(a). 
B. Model Rule 4.2 Communication with Person Represented by Counsel; 
and Model Rule 4.3 Dealing with Unrepresented Person 
1. 4.2. A lawyer shall not communicate about the subject matter of a 
representation with a person who the lawyer knows to be represented 
by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of 
the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court order. 
  
 10. Id. 
 11. See Barry Temkin, Deception in Undercover Investigations: Conduct-Based vs. Status-
Based Ethical Analysis, 32 Seattle U.L. Rev. 123, 123 (2008-2009). 
 12. Id. 
 13. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(A) (2012) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. 
 14. Id. cmt. 1. 
 15. MODEL RULES R. 4.1. 
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2. 4.3. In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not repre-
sented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is 
disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know 
that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the 
matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misun-
derstanding. 
Monsanto Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. is an example of the inter-
play between Rules 4.2 and 4.3 as they apply to interviewing current 
employees and former employees in undercover investigations during the 
pendency of litigation. Monsanto complained that investigators em-
ployed by defendant insurers misled former Monsanto employees in the 
course of investigating claims at issue in the lawsuit. Monsanto asserted 
that the investigators’ conduct violated Rules 4.2, 4.3 and 5.3 of the Del-
aware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct.16 Monsanto submitted 
affidavits in support of their claims that investigators did not inquire as to 
whether counsel represented the interviewee, failed to inform the inter-
viewees that they represented insurance companies, or misrepresented 
the scope of their representation.17 
The defendant’s responded by stating that interviews with former 
employees do not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct. The court 
reasoned that Rule 4.2 does not prohibit contacts with former employees 
since former employees are not parties to the litigation and cannot bind 
their former employees.18 However, an attorney has ethical obligations 
not to imply that the lawyer is disinterested, should reasonably know that 
the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the matter, 
and is obligated to correct the misunderstanding.19 The defendant’s re-
sponse was that “an investigator whose firm has been retained by a law-
yer complies with Rule 4.3 by simply stating that he is an investigator 
seeking information.20 The court did not agree and reasoned that Rule 
4.3, read in conjunction with Rule 4.2, requires more than a simple dis-
closure by the investigator of his identity, and that former employees 
who are unrepresented by counsel should be warned of the positions of 
the parties to a dispute.21 The court concluded by stating: 
When the investigators did not determine if former employees 
were represented by counsel, when the investigators did not clearly 
identify themselves as working for attorneys who were representing a 
client which was involved in litigation against their former employer, 
when investigators did not clearly state the purpose of the interview 
  
 16. Monsanto Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 593 A.2d 1013, 1013–16 (Sup. Ct. Del. 
1990). 
 17. Id. at 1016. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 1018. 
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and where affirmative misrepresentations regarding these matters 
were made, Rule 4.2 and Rule 4.3 were violated.22 
The court in Monsanto proceeded to implement policy and proce-
dures to guide the conduct of interviews with both current and former 
employees in order to avoid running afoul of Rules 4.2 and 4.3. During 
pendency of litigation, it is now standard procedure for courts to imple-
ment policy and procedures to guide the conduct of both parties to the 
litigation. 
C. Model Rule 5.3(b) Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants; 
and Model Rule 8.4(a) A lawyer cannot circumvent the Rules through 
acts of another. 
1. Rule 5.3(b). Nonlawyer retained by a lawyer having direct super-
visory authority over the nonlawyer is responsible for a nonlawyer 
violation through involvement, knowledge, or supervisory authority 
if the lawyer orders, directs, or ratifies the conduct. 
2. Rule 8.4(a). A lawyer cannot violate or attempt to violate the Rules 
of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, 
or do so through the acts of another. 
Can an undercover investigator employ deceptive tactics ? Model 
Rule 5.3(b) answers this question by requiring lawyers with supervisory 
authority over nonlawyers “to make reasonable efforts to ensure that the 
person’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the 
lawyer.”23 In essence, a nonlawyer such as an investigator cannot do 
something that the lawyer would be prohibited from doing. Model Rule 
5.3(b) also requires lawyers to give nonlawyers appropriate instruction 
and supervision concerning the ethical aspects of their employment and 
should be responsible for their work product.24 Thus, the lawyer is ulti-
mately responsible for his or her ethical behavior and that of the investi-
gators whom he has retained. Comment 1 of Model Rule 5.3 emphasizes 
a lawyer’s responsibility and ultimate liability when supervising nonlaw-
yer employees or independent contractors. Investigation agencies are 
considered independent contractors and their actions will be imputed to a 
law firm or in-house counsel. Comment 1 further explains that “measures 
employed in supervising nonlawyers should take into account of the fact 
that they do not have legal training and are not subject to professional 
discipline.”25 So it is the lawyer who will be held accountable for any 
deceptive behavior on the part of an undercover investigator. 
  
 22. Id. at 1020. 
 23. MODEL RULES R. 5.3(b). 
 24. Id. cmt 1. 
 25. Id.  
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Under the ABA Model Rules, Rule 5.3 in conjunction with Rules 
8.4 and 4.1 clearly do not authorize the use of deceptive tactics in order 
to obtain closely held information about a potential M&A target. Law-
yers that employ such deceptive tactics risk being subject to professional 
discipline and possible disbarment. However, there is a growing trend in 
several jurisdictions—where states have either amended or rewritten 
their legal ethics rules—to permit lawyers to engage in undercover inves-
tigations involving deceptive techniques in limited circumstances.26 Such 
limited circumstances include cases dealing with criminal law, civil 
rights or intellectual property law. Some states, such as Oregon, permit 
the use of indirect deception in undercover investigations. Indirect decep-
tion is the lawyer supervision of undercover investigators who engage in 
deceptive conduct. Oregon’s Rule 8.4 is not limited to a lawyer’s status 
such as a criminal or government lawyer, or the substantive nature of the 
claim, such civil rights or intellectual property. Other states, such as New 
York, have proposed amendments to their states’ version of Rule 8.4 
allowing lawyer supervision of undercover investigations. The New 
York state proposed amendment almost mirrors Oregon’s Rule 8.4, and 
an actual amendment to the rule in New York would be a significant 
change due to the large volume of M&A transactions that take place in 
the state. 
The following section looks at how the courts view pretexting as 
applied in various jurisdictions and areas of law. Court opinions widely 
diverge among the various states regarding the use of pretexting. 
III. THE COURTS VIEW OF THE USE OF PRETEXTING  
Not surprisingly, most of the court opinions dealing with whether to 
permit or prohibit pretexting consist of criminal, civil rights, or intellec-
tual property law cases, and the outcomes are highly dependent upon the 
jurisdiction and facts of each case. In the cases that permit pretexting and 
admit evidence of the investigation, the courts look to whether it would 
be difficult to discover the violations by other means. For example, a 
“tester” that poses as a customer in order to buy goods that infringe on a 
valid trademark. The courts look most favorably upon pretexting that 
does not coerce the target and is a part of the normal course of business, 
as well as investigations conducted indirectly with the supervision of a 
lawyer rather than conducted directly by a lawyer. The court cases that 
follow examine the facts and circumstances that allow evidence obtained 
by pretexting and those that do not allow evidence obtained by pre-
texting. 
  
 26. See generally ASSOC. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, PROPOSED AMENDMENT 
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A. Court Decisions that Allow Evidence Obtained by Pretexting 
In Apple Corps Ltd. v. International Collectors Society, a trademark 
infringement case, the owners of the Beatles trademarks sued a stamp 
producer to enjoin unauthorized reproductions of likenesses of the Beat-
les on stamps. The court entered an injunction, but the plaintiffs’ sus-
pected the defendants violated the injunction and hired investigators that 
revealed violations of the decree and the plaintiffs’ moved for contempt 
sanctions. The defendant’s sought sanctions because the investigators 
violated Rule 4.2 prohibiting contact with persons represented by coun-
sel. The District Court for the District of New Jersey found no ethical 
violation and that the investigators’ misrepresentations as to their identity 
and purpose were “necessary to discover defendants’ violations . . . and 
did not constitute unethical behavior.”27 The court also found that posing 
as a “normal customer” in gathering evidence about the defendant’s 
“day-to-day practices in the ordinary course of business” did not consti-
tute misrepresentation.28 As for misrepresentations made by the investi-
gators’ identity and purpose under Rule 8.4(c), the court stated: 
RPC 4.2 cannot apply where lawyers and their investigators, 
seeking to learn about current corporate misconduct, act as members 
of the general public to engage in ordinary business transactions with 
low-level employees of a represented corporation. To apply the rule 
to the investigation which took place here would serve merely to 
immunize corporations from liability for unlawful activity, while not 
effectuating any of the purposes behind the rule.29 
The court made it clear that New Jersey law extended protection of 
Rule 4.2 only to the company’s “litigation control group,” and that the 
contacted sales clerks , did not fall within that group, thereby allowing 
the communication.30 Also, it appears, at least in this jurisdiction, surrep-
titious contact by investigators of certain employees in the ordinary 
course of business to determine if corporate misconduct is taking place is 
not misrepresentation of one’s identity and purpose under Rule 8.4(c). 
In Gidatex v. Campaniello Imports, Ltd, a trademark case in New 
York, the plaintiff terminated defendant’s license to sell its furniture, but 
the defendant continued to sell the brand. Plaintiff’s counsel hired private 
investigators to pose as interior designers and record incriminating con-
versations with the defendant’s sales staff.31 Defendant filed a motion to 
exclude the evidence on grounds that the plaintiffs obtained the evidence 
unethically and illegally. The court denied the motion stating that the 
prohibition of contacting adverse parties represented by counsel, Rule 
  
 27. Apple Corps Ltd. v. Int’l Collectors Society, 15 Supp. 2d 456, 471 (D. N.J. 1998). 
 28. Id. at 475. 
 29. Id. at 474-75. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Gidatex v. Campaniello Imports, Ltd, 82 F. Supp. 2d 119, 119-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
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4.2, was inapplicable and that the plaintiff’s attorneys had not violated 
the ethics rules even if they did apply.32 The court explained that the rea-
son for Rule 4.2 was to prevent circumvention of the attorney-client priv-
ilege. Again, as in Apple Corps Ltd., the court reasoned that “These ethi-
cal rules should not govern situations where a party is legitimately inves-
tigating potential unfair business practices by use of an undercover [in-
vestigator] posing as a member of the general public engaging in ordi-
nary business transactions with the target.”33 The facts in Gidatex were 
very similar to Apple Corps Ltd. except for the recording of conversa-
tions, where the court emphasized that the Model Rules should not apply 
when investigating corporate misconduct such as unfair business practic-
es. 
In a departure from the intellectual property law cases just re-
viewed, Hill v. Shell Oil Co. was a civil rights case in Illinois dealing 
with racial discrimination allegations. The plaintiffs conducted under-
cover investigations of gas station employees to prove discriminatory 
practices and the defendants moved for a protective order under Rules 
4.2 and 4.3. The court found for the employees under Rule 4.2 as being 
represented by counsel, but Rule 4.3 was deemed inapplicable.34 The 
court also made a distinction from the previous cases in this area, alt-
hough counsel represented the defendants, by stating: 
Lawyers (and investigators) cannot trick protected employees 
into doing things or saying things they otherwise would not do or 
say. They probably can employ persons to play the role of customers 
seeking services on the same basis as the general public. They can 
videotape protected employees going about their activities in what 
those employees believe is the normal course.35 
The court stressed that the video recordings were proper as long as 
they were in the “ordinary course of conduct,” but investigators cannot 
trick employees into doing things or saying things they otherwise would 
not do. 
B. Court Decisions that Forbid Evidence Obtained by Pretexting 
In Midwest Motor Sports, Inc. v. Arctic Cat Sales, Inc., the court re-
fused to allow evidence obtained by pretexting and affirmed sanctions 
against counsel for deceptive conduct for conducting interviews under 
false pretenses in violation of Rule 8.4(c). The case involved the discon-
tinuance of the sale of a line of snowmobiles at the plaintiff’s store.36 The 
defendant’s counsel hired a private investigator to talk with and find out 
which snowmobiles the salesperson recommended. The investigator rec-
  
 32. Id. at 120. 
 33. Id. at 122. 
 34. Hill v. Shell Oil Co., 209 F. Supp. 2d 876 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
 35. Id. at 880. 
 36. Midwest Motor Sports, Inc. v. Arctic Cat Sales, Inc., 347 F.3d 693 (8th Cir. 2003). 
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orded the conversation with the salesperson with the intention that the 
salesperson would offer information about the lawsuit.37 The investigator 
also admitted in a deposition that his purpose was to elicit evidence ra-
ther than to reveal evidence of how salespeople treat typical consumers.38 
The court addressed Rule 4.2 by stating that its purpose was to prevent 
adverse party statements by circumventing opposing counsel and to pro-
tect the attorney-client relationship. The court also stated that not all cor-
porate employees fall under Rule 4.2, but that the salesperson’s conduct 
would be imputed to the plaintiff and thus fall under the protection of 
Rule 4.2 .39 The investigator’s purpose was to elicit information rather 
than to reveal evidence of how typical consumers would be treated, 
thereby departing from the reasoning in other cases. Additionally, the 
court found the no contact provision of Rule 4.2 protected the salesman. . 
In Monsanto Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., an insurance de-
fense case, the defendants hired investigators during pendency of litiga-
tion to interview former employees of Monsanto to investigate possibil-
ity of alleged dumping of toxic waste.40 The investigator’s misrepresent-
ed their identity and purpose for the interviews, and the lawyers’ for the 
defense were found to have violated Rules 4.2, 4.3, and 5.3 of profes-
sional conduct. Since the interviews were conducted during the pendency 
of litigation, the court, following precedent, implemented procedures to 
“guide the conduct of interviews with both current and former employ-
ees” in order to prevent the behavior from “tainting” the trial.41 The court 
further stated, “attorneys who are officers of this court must realize that 
they are accountable and must supervise the investigators in order to 
assure that the type of misleading conduct that has previously occurred 
will not happen in the future.”42 Additionally, under comment one of 
Rule 5.3, a lawyer must give investigators appropriate instruction and 
supervision concerning ethical aspects of their engagement with a lawyer 
and should be responsible for their work product.43 The last statement 
reinforces the idea that lawyers should closely supervise indirectly-
conducted investigations. 
In re Gatti, Oregon lawyer Daniel Gatti represented chiropractors 
who had been charged with racketeering and fraud as a result of under-
cover investigations conducted by the SAIF Corporation (SAIF).44 Gatti 
filed a complaint with the Oregon Bar claiming that the lawyers involved 
with the SAIF investigations had advised SAIF investigators to pose as 
  
 37. Id. at 694. 
 38. Id. at 696. 
 39. Id. at 698. 
 40. Monsanto Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 593 A.2d 1013, 1013-16 (Sup. Ct. Del. 
1990). 
 41. Id.at 1020. 
 42. Id. 
 43. MODEL RULES R. 5.3, cmt. 1. 
 44. In re Gatti, 8 P. 3d 966, 966 (Or. 2000). 
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injured patients and janitors in order to gather evidence of fraudulent 
workers’ compensation claims.45 Gatti’s complaint to the bar accused the 
prosecutors involved with giving supervisory advice to SAIF investiga-
tors, thereby violating several rules of the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility. The state bar disciplinary board declined to take action and con-
cluded that, “Our preliminary conclusion is that if SAIF is considered to 
have public authority to root out possible fraud, then attorneys assisting 
SAIF in this endeavor are not acting unethically in providing advice on 
how to conduct a legal undercover operation. It is our understanding that 
no court has found [SAIF] to have been illegal or to constitute prosecuto-
rial misconduct.”46 The state bar responded to Gatti by stating that they 
were not aware of any prosecutorial powers that “have more latitude in 
carrying out the agency’s regulatory powers in a surreptitious fashion 
than members of the Bar in the private sector.”47 
This comment led Gatti to begin his own investigation into a Cali-
fornia company, Comprehensive Medical Review (CMR) that was sus-
pected of falsely denying medical claims of patients. Gatti telephoned 
CMR and identified himself as a chiropractor, recorded his conversations 
with the agency, and used this information to file a civil lawsuit alleging 
fraud against CMR.48 In the recorded conversations, Gatti lied about his 
identity and purpose and CMR learned about his deception and filed a 
grievance against him for violating the Oregon Code involving dishones-
ty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.49 Gatti defended his actions by 
stating that he relied on the bar counsel’s written response that the use of 
deception in undercover investigations was appropriate by either gov-
ernment or private lawyers.50 Gatti’s case eventually made it to the Ore-
gon Supreme Court, which held that Gatti’s reliance on the bar counsel’s 
letter was not reasonable.51 The court ultimately found that Gatti misrep-
resented his identity to CMR and sanctioned Gatti. 
While Gatti’s case was on appeal, the U.S. Attorney for the District 
of Oregon filed an amicus curiae brief asking for an exception in under-
cover law enforcement operations and civil rights organizations asked for 
their own exceptions for undercover operations.52 The court rejected all 
claims and stood fast by stating, “this court’s case law does not permit 
recognition of an exception for any lawyer to engage in dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, misrepresentations, or false statements.”53 However, the 
court’s stance did not last long after the Justice Department filed suit to 
  
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 969. 
 47. Id. at 974. 
 48. Id. at 970. 
 49. Id. at 972. 
 50. Id. at 973. 
 51. Id. at 979. 
 52. Id. at 975. 
 53. Id. at 976. 
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enjoin the Oregon Bar from enforcing its ethics rule against undercover 
operations. Oregon ultimately amended its ethics rules permitting indi-
rect deception in undercover operations by all practicing lawyers whether 
public or private. 
The following section will look at the current ethics rules regarding 
Rule 8.4(c) in Colorado and Oregon. The Colorado Supreme Court has 
endorsed a zero tolerance approach to the use of deceptive tactics in un-
dercover investigations, whereas Oregon’s Rule 8.4(c) prohibits direct 
deception by a lawyer but allows indirect deception by a lawyer to advise 
and supervise undercover investigations. Therefore, each state is at oppo-
site ends of the ethics spectrum concerning Rule 8.4(c) and its prohibi-
tion of conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. 
IV. COLORADO AND OREGON AT OPPOSITE ENDS OF THE ETHICS 
SPECTRUM 
A. No Exception for Any Deceptive Conduct by Lawyers in Colorado 
Under CRPC Rule 8.4, it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to 
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, know-
ingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of an-
other.54 Colorado places a categorical prohibition on the use of deceptive 
tactics by lawyers and allows for no exceptions to the Model Rule, in-
cluding civil, criminal, and constitutional rights.55 
People v. Pautler reaffirmed the Colorado Rule, when the Colorado 
Supreme Court upheld disciplinary sanctions for a state prosecutor who 
posed as a public defender to help apprehend a suspect that had con-
fessed to killing three women and raping another woman with whom he 
was also holding as a hostage.56 Pautler claimed that his deception was 
justified because of his belief that the suspect would kill his hostage and 
possibly harm others. The Colorado Disciplinary Court and the Colorado 
Supreme Court disagreed with Pautler and held that Pautler had lied to 
the suspect in violation of CRPC 8.4(c), prohibiting fraud, deceit, or mis-
representation.57 The court in Pautler proclaimed, “that members of our 
profession must adhere to the highest moral and ethical standards and 
that those standards apply regardless of motive.”58 In 2012, the Pre-
texting Subcommittee of the Colorado Supreme Court Standing Commit-
  
 54. COLORADO RULES R. 8.4(a) (2012); 
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 55. See People v. Dunlap, 35 P.3d 571 (Colo.O.P.D.J. 2001), aff’d In re Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175 
(Colo. 2002). 
 56. See COLORADO RULES R. 8.4(c) (2012) (citing Temkin, supra note 9, at 123).  
 57. Pautler, 47 P.3d at 1176. 
2016] CONFLICT BETWEEN PRETEXTING AND THE ABA 435 
tee for the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct (“Pretexting Com-
mittee”) rejected the recommendation for a limited exception to Rule 
8.4(c) despite the uncertainty resulting from the precedent set in the Paut-
ler case and pleas from stakeholders such as the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice, the Colorado District Attorney’s Council, the Attorney General of 
Colorado, and the International Trademark Association to name a few.59 
The opposition to amend Colorado Rule 8.4(c) to allow a Colorado-
specific exception for attorney misrepresentation in certain situations 
noted the absence of any case in Colorado involving a covert investiga-
tion. Additionally, the opposition had concern for public persona of law-
yers allowed to direct, or supervise others in lawful covert activity in-
volving misrepresentation.60 
B. Indirect Deception in Undercover Investigations Allowed by All Law-
yers in Oregon 
As discussed above, the Oregon Supreme Court approved an 
amendment to allow for deceptive conduct by lawyers who indirectly 
supervise investigators in lawful covert activity. The amended Rule 
8.4(b) states:  
It shall not be professional misconduct for a lawyer to advise 
clients or others about or to supervise lawful covert activity in the in-
vestigation of violations of civil or criminal law or constitutional 
rights, provided the lawyer’s conduct is otherwise in compliance with 
these Rules of Professional Conduct. “Covert activity,” as used in 
this rule, means an effort to obtain information on unlawful activity 
through the use of misrepresentation or other subterfuge.61  
The Rule also states that a lawyer may commence covert activity, 
but the lawyer can only advise and supervise the investigation and cannot 
be directly involved. Furthermore, a lawyer must “in good faith believe 
there is a reasonable possibility that unlawful activity has taken place, is 
taking place or will take place in the foreseeable future.”62 This last sen-
tence gives a lawyer wide latitude regarding when an undercover investi-
gation can take place and under what circumstances it can take place. 
Oregon later added 8.4(a)(3) to the Oregon Rules that prohibits only de-
ception “that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law.”63 
This amended provision gives even more latitude because almost any 
civil law violation could be a justification for using deception in investi-
gations. Does this open the door for the use of undercover investigations 
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 61. OR. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b) [hereinafter OREGON RULES]. 
 62. Id. 
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during the due diligence phase of an M&A transaction? Fraud is a viola-
tion of civil law, and there are many M&A transactions where fraud is 
present, my above example is just one. 
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION TO COLORADO ETHICS RULE 8.4(C) 
The proposed solution to the Colorado Rules of Professional Con-
duct, Rule 8.4(c) is an effort to reconcile the conflict between Rule 
8.4(c)’s proscription of misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, 
or misrepresentation and the actual practices of lawyers and courts in the 
State of Colorado. The State of Colorado is in need of an ethics rule that 
is practical and can realistically guide legal practitioners in responsible 
supervision of legal pretext investigations. The below proposed amend-
ment is taken from Oregon’s amended version of Rule 8.4(a)(3) and 
8.4(b). 
A. Amendment to Colorado Rule 8.4(c) Misconduct Involving Dishones-
ty, Fraud, Deceit or Misrepresentation 
A proposed amendment to Colorado Rule 8.4(c) should resemble 
Oregon’s Rule 8.4(a)(3) and 8.4(b) as amended in 2002. The Colorado 
proposed ethics rule would read as follows: 
Rule 8.4 MISCONDUCT 
(a)  It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
(3) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrep-
resentation that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s fitness to practice 
law; 
(b) Notwithstanding paragraphs (a)(1), (3) and (4) and Rule 
3.3(a)(1), it shall not be professional misconduct for a lawyer to ad-
vise clients or others about or to supervise lawful covert activity in 
the investigation of violations of civil or criminal law or constitution-
al rights, provided the lawyer’s conduct is otherwise in compliance 
with these Rules of Professional Conduct. 
“Covert activity,” as used in this rule, means an effort to obtain 
information on unlawful activity through the use of misrepresentation 
or other subterfuge. “Covert activity” may be commenced by a law-
yer or involve a lawyer as an advisor or supervisor only when the 
lawyer in good faith believes there is a reasonable possibility that un-
lawful activity has taken place, is taking place or will take place in 
the foreseeable future. 
B. Policy Justification 
For the reasons stated above, the proposed amendment will recon-
cile the conflict between current Colorado Rule 8.4(c) and its zero toler-
ance for misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresen-
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tation, and the widespread practice of the use of undercover investiga-
tions utilizing pretexting to identify and prevent unlawful activity. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Investigators are an indispensable tool for lawyers. Lawyers from 
almost all legal disciplines utilize private investigators in undercover 
operations such as criminal investigations, discrimination cases, and the 
protection intellectual property. In the M&A context, covert investiga-
tions utilizing legal and ethical techniques such as pretexting can provide 
strategic insight into operational risks that can be immediately confront-
ed and resolved or avoided before potential catastrophic financial dam-
age occurs. 
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct as well as the Colo-
rado Rules Professional Conduct proscribe conduct involving dishonesty, 
deceit, or misrepresentation, yet practicing lawyers and the courts are in 
direct conflict with this rule on a daily basis. So, what is going on here? 
Should we just go about our business and pretend that this conflict does 
not exist, or should we confront the issue head on and amend the Rules 
to reflect reality? Personally, I must ethically and responsibly endorse the 
latter. 
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